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§1. INTRODUCTION
While the case Netherlands v. Commission deals with a controversy in the specifi c area of 
statistical cooperation, it is relevant for almost every area of EU law because the dispute 
actually revolved around the limits to the Commission’s power when it implements or 
supplements legislative acts. Although the case was ruled some six years aft er the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it still dealt with a pre-Lisbon comitology procedure. As 
will be shown, the case neatly illustrates the diffi  culties in putting into eff ect the Lisbon 
Treaty’s reform in the area of executive decision-making and specifi cally the issue which 
Craig dubbed as the ‘transitional classifi cation problem’.1
§2. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON COMITOLOGY
In order to properly understand the legal issues posed by Netherlands v. Commission it is 
necessary to briefl y present the comitology system, pre- and post-Lisbon.2 Pre-Lisbon, 
the comitology system found its legal basis in ex Article 202 EC, whereby the legislator 
(actually the Council) could confer implementing powers on the Commission. When 
* Post-doctoral assistant at the Ghent European Law Institute, University of Ghent (Jean Monnet Centre 
of Excellence) and Visiting Professor at the University of Antwerp.
1 P. Craig, ‘Delegated Acts, Implementing Acts and the New Comitology Regulation’, 36 European Law 
Review (2011), p. 675–677. In relation to this issue, however, Craig stressed that the scope of Article 290 
TFEU encompassed, but was also broader than that of the PRAC (see footnote 37 below). However, the 
case presently discussed suggests that the scope of the PRAC would not be restricted to Article 290 
TFEU either, the latter not completely encompassing the PRAC.
2 For an earlier discussion of this topic in this Journal, see Z. Xhaferri, ‘Delegated Acts, Implementing 
Acts, and Institutional Balance Implications Post-Lisbon’, 20 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law (2013), p. 558–561.
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exercising these powers, the Commission was assisted by committees composed of 
national experts (hence comitology) and the notion of ‘implementation’ was given 
a broad meaning, encompassing both implementation in the strict sense as well as 
amending formal legislation. Th e precise procedure to be followed by the Commission 
was laid down in the (second) comitology decision, which contained a number 
of diff erent procedures. Th e weightiest of those was the regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny (PRAC), which allowed both the Council and the Parliament to veto a draft  
decision of the Commission (even if the committee had expressed a positive opinion 
on the draft ). However, the PRAC only applied when a legislative act adopted pursuant 
to the co-decision procedure was amended on its non-essential elements through 
a measure of general scope, where amending could mean ‘deleting some of those 
elements or by supplementing the instrument by the addition of new non-essential 
elements’.3
Th e Treaty of Lisbon reformed the comitology system by making a distinction 
between implementation in the strict sense through implementing acts (Article  291 
TFEU) and the amendment or supplementation of legislative acts through delegated 
acts (Article 290 TFEU). Th e procedures of the (second) comitology decision were then 
also replaced by new ones through the comitology regulation adopted on the basis of 
Article 291(3) TFEU. Th e exception here was the PRAC, since in most cases the references 
(in legislative acts) to the PRAC should not be replaced with a reference to a comitology 
procedure (of the new comitology regulation), but with a reference to the delegated 
act under Article  290 TFEU, for which there is no horizontal instrument.4 Updating 
these legislative acts to the new legal reality of the Lisbon Treaty would thus require an 
amendment of every single one of these legislative acts, a process which the Commission 
had wanted to conclude before the end of the 7th parliamentary term in 2014 (compare 
with the below). However, through the Council, Member States have obstructed that 
process as the PRAC allows them a much greater say in the decision-making procedure 
than that foreseen in the procedure to adopt delegated acts. In a way, the PRAC therefore 
lives on as a zombie in EU law: dead but not quite.
§3. FACTS OF THE CASE AND PLEAS
Th e facts leading to the controversy in Netherlands v. Commission are rather 
straightforward. To ensure that consumer price indices (calculated by the Member 
3 See Article  2(2) of Council Decision (EC) 1999/468 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, as amended by Council Decision (EC) 2006/512 
amending Decision 1999/468/EC, [2006] OJ L 200/11.
4 See B. Daiber, ‘EU-Durchführungsrechtsetzung nach Inkraft treten der neuen Komitologie-
Verordnung’, 47 Europarecht (2012), p. 241; D. Bianchi, ‘La comitologie est morte! vive la comitologie! 
– Premières réfl exions sur l’exécution du droit de l’Union après le Traité de Lisbonne – L’exemple de la 
Politique agricole commune’, 48 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2012), p. 96.
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State authorities and then forwarded to the Commission) are comparable, the Council 
adopted Regulation 2494/95 in 1995.5 Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, Regulation 2494/95 was amended by a legislative act adopted pursuant to the 
co-decision procedure.6 Finally, in 2009 the Regulation was amended again to allow 
further measures to be adopted pursuant to the PRAC,7 the procedure created by the 
2006 amendment to the (second) comitology decision.8
Th rough the PRAC, the Commission adopted two regulations in 2013, one amending 
an earlier Commission measure and one directly implementing (in the pre-Lisbon sense) 
Regulation 2494/95.9 As these two Commission regulations were adopted following the 
PRAC, rather than one of the procedures provided for under the comitology regulation, 
they were not adopted as ‘implementing’ acts as prescribed by Article 291(4) TFEU. Th ese 
two acts empowered the Commission (more specifi cally Eurostat) to adopt guidelines 
and manuals constituting the methodological frameworks to be used by the Member 
States’ authorities to calculate (in a harmonized way) infl ation indices. However, the 
two Commission regulations simply empowered Eurostat to adopt these guidelines and 
manuals without prescribing a clear procedure for their adoption. Th e Netherlands took 
issue with this, arguing (i) that only the Commission (but not Eurostat) could be empowered; 
(ii) that the guidelines, which it found to be binding legal acts, should be adopted in the 
form of decisions, directives or regulations (as foreseen in Article 288 TFEU); (iii) that the 
Commission should have prescribed the PRAC to adopt the guidelines and manuals since 
that is the procedure prescribed by the basic legislative act or alternatively (iv) that one of 
the procedures of the comitology regulation ought to have been prescribed.10
§4. JUDGMENT
Th e General Court focused exclusively on the third of these pleas,11 and rephrased the 
controversy before it as follows:
5 Council Regulation (EC) 2494/95 concerning harmonized indices of consumer prices, [1995] OJ L 
257/1.
6 Regulation (EC) 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council adapting to Council 
Decision 1999/468/EC the provisions relating to committees which assist the Commission in the 
exercise of its implementing powers laid down in instruments subject to the procedure referred to in 
Article 251 of the EC Treaty, [2004] OJ L 284/1.
7 Regulation (EC) 596/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council adapting a number of 
instruments subject to the procedure referred to in Article  251 of the Treaty to Council Decision 
1999/468/EC with regard to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, [2009] OJ L 188/14.
8 See Council Decision (EC) 1999/468.
9 Commission Regulation (EU) 119/2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 2214/96 concerning harmonised 
indices of consumer prices (HICP), [2013] OJ L 41/1; Commission Regulation (EU) 93/2013 laying 
down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 2494/95, [2013] OJ L 33/14.
10 See Joined Cases T-261/13 and T-86/14 Netherlands v. Commission, EU:T:2015:671, para. 32.
11 Ibid., para. 35.
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Th e pleas relied on by the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the absence of recourse 
to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny therefore raise the question of whether Regulation 
No 2494/95 has been correctly implemented by the Commission where, in the contested 
provisions, the Commission has entrusted Eurostat with the task of establishing and updating 
the methodological frameworks for calculating price indices without providing for the 
application of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny.12
Surprisingly however, instead of fi rst testing the contested provisions in the light of the 
second comitology decision which defi nes the PRAC’s fi eld of application, the Court 
found it expedient to refer to Article 291 TFEU. It also referred to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union’s (CJEU) fi nding in Biocides13 that an implementing act under 
Article  291 TFEU should be used when the Commission is called upon ‘to provide 
further detail in relation to the content of the legislative act, in order to ensure that it is 
implemented under uniform conditions in all Member States’.14 In addition, following 
the CJEU’s decision in Eures network,15 the Commission is entitled to adopt all measures 
which are necessary or appropriate for the implementation of a legislative act in so far 
as these measures comply with the legislative act’s essential general aims.16 Applying 
this post-Lisbon case law on Article  291 TFEU to the guidelines and manuals which 
Eurostat was called upon to adopt, the General Court concluded that they indeed 
constitute measures implementing the legislative regulation.17 As a result, it found 
that the guidelines and manuals should be adopted following the PRAC, just like the 
contested Commission regulations themselves.18 In the remainder of its judgment, the 
Court refuted the Commission’s arguments to the contrary.
§5. COMMENT
Th e present case is a perfect illustration of the Lisbon Treaty’s unfulfi lled promise of 
simplifi cation and enhanced transparency, in casu in executive rule-making. While the 
introduction of a distinction between implementing and delegated acts was theoretically 
sound and therefore to be welcomed,19 the Treaty’s reform has not been followed up in 
practice. Of course, commentators had already noted early on that applying the distinction 
12 Ibid., para. 41.
13 Case C-427/12 Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:170.
14 Joined Cases T-261/13 and T-86/14 Netherlands v. Commission, para. 43.
15 Case C-65/13 Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2014:2289.
16 Joined Cases T-261/13 and T-86/14 Netherlands v. Commission, para. 45.
17 Ibid., para. 48.
18 Ibid., para. 50.
19 See inter alia D. Bianchi, 48 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2012), p. 83. For an argument in favour 
of the Lisbon Treaty’s distinction in constitutional terms, see R. Schütze, European constitutional law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 238–240.
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between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU in practice might not be an easy undertaking.20 A 
delegated act supplementing a legislative act, or an implementing act implementing a 
legislative act might, aft er all, be diffi  cult to distinguish because in both cases something 
is ‘added’ to the (basic) legislative act.21 Th is basic diffi  culty posed itself in the present 
case and it was further complicated by the aggravating factor that the Court had to deal 
with the PRAC, a procedure which fi nds its origins under Article 202 EC but which still 
lives on post-Lisbon as long as the many references to the PRAC in secondary legislation 
have not been updated in the light of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (compare above).
Th e Court in its judgment then seems driven by a concern to uphold the Lisbon 
Treaty’s reform of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, oblivious of the fact that the PRAC does 
not come under either of both Articles. Indeed, the question in casu was whether the 
PRAC ought to be used to adopt the guidelines and manuals. To answer this question, one 
fi rst ought to look at the PRAC’s fi eld of application as defi ned by the second comitology 
decision. According to the latter, the measures which may be adopted through the PRAC 
should be measures of general application which delete certain non-essential elements of 
a legislative act (not relevant in casu) or which supplement the legislative act by adding 
new non-essential elements.
Had the Court taken this approach, it would have had to address the question of 
whether the guidelines and manuals (which clearly would not delete non-essential 
elements of the basic legislative act) would supplement the legislative act. Here it is 
worth stressing the diff erence in wording between Article  2(2) of the comitology 
decision (defi ning the PRAC’s fi eld of application) and Article  290 TFEU. Whereas 
the latter refers to ‘amending’ and ‘supplementing’ as two diff erent techniques, a 
distinction recently stressed by the Court in the Connecting Europe Facility case,22 the 
20 Hofmann for instance noted that the two Articles give expression to the traditional idea of executive 
federalism (although this is really only the case for Article 291 TFEU), whereas the implementation of 
EU law in practice is much more complex and depends on networks and close cooperation between 
national and EU executive actors. Th e distinction would thereby simply be outdated. See H. Hofmann, 
‘Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets Reality’, 
15 European Law Journal (2009), p. 497–499. Stelkens notes that Article 291(2) TFEU does not prevent 
the legislator from laying down itself the detailed provisions ensuring a uniform implementation 
of its legislation in the basic act and concludes from this that the legislator can also delegate this 
power under Article  290 TFEU. See U. Stelkens, ‘Art.  291 AEUV, das Unionsverwaltungsrecht und 
die Verwaltungsautonomie der Mitgliedstaaten -zugleich zur Abgrenzung der Anwendungsbereiche 
von Art. 290 und Art. 291 AEUV’, 47 Europarecht (2012), p. 542. Still diff erently, Craig and Bianchi 
stressed that both an implementing act and a (supplementing) delegated act may ‘add’ something to a 
basic (legislative) act. See P. Craig, 36 European Law Review (2011), p. 672–674; D. Bianchi, 48 Revue 
trimestrielle de droit européen (2012), p. 93.
21 See P. Craig, 36 European Law Review (2011), p. 672–674; D. Bianchi, 48 Revue trimestrielle de droit 
européen (2012), p. 93; Z. Xhaferri, 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2013), 
p. 563–564.
22 Case C-286/14 Parliament v. Commission, EU:C:2016:183. While the Court was right to distinguish 
the two, it is doubtful whether the distinction is anything more than a legal nicety, since, materially, 
there does not seem to be anything which a supplementing delegated act could not introduce which an 
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comitology decision refers to amending as ‘inter alia (…) deleting some (…) elements or 
(…) supplementing the instrument by the addition of new (…) elements’. Th e awkward 
phrasing was the result of a disagreement among some Member States about the type 
of measures which ought to be adopted using the new procedure. While all Member 
States agreed that the PRAC should be used to adopt quasi-legislative measures,23 some 
Member States preferred a minimalistic approach restricted to measures that formally 
change a legislative act, while others wanted to include quasi-legislative measures, in 
so far as they are not implementing measures, supplementing a legislative act.24 With 
the backing of the European Parliament, the second group got the upper hand even if 
it was already clear at the time that distinguishing between quasi-legislative measures 
supplementing a legislative act and implementing measures supplementing a legislative 
act would sometimes be diffi  cult.25 Only the former would then come under the PRAC 
as was stressed by the Council Legal Service in its opinion on the 2006 amendment to the 
second comitology decision.26
Th e question which the General Court then ought to have addressed was whether the 
guidelines and manuals to be adopted by Eurostat, supplementing Regulation 2494/95, 
would amount to quasi-legislative measures or instead whether the regulation would 
merely be implemented, that is, given practical eff ect.27 Th ey should only be adopted 
amending delegated act could (the exception being the introduction of provisions which contravene 
provisions of the basic legislative act). Th e CJEU’s distinction between amending and supplementing in 
Connecting Europe Facility also sits uneasily with its broad (non-formal) defi nition of ‘amending’ in Visa 
Reciprocity. See Case C-88/14 Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2015:499, para. 42–43. For a 
discussion of this case, See M. Chamon, ‘Th e dividing line between delegated and implementing acts, part 
two: Th e Court of Justice settles the issue in Commission v. Parliament and Council (Visa reciprocity)’, 
52 Common Market Law Review (2015), p.  1617–1634. Th ese cases show that depending on how one 
understands ‘amending’, i.e. in a formal or a substantive sense, there may (not) be an overlap between 
‘amending’ and ‘supplementing’. Only if it is understood in a substantive sense can the overlap referred to 
by Xhaferri exist, see Z. Xhaferri, 20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2013), p. 563.
23 G. Schusterschitz and S. Kotz, ‘Th e Comitology Reform of 2006: Increasing the Powers of the European 
Parliament Without Changing the Treaties’, 3 European Constitutional Law Review (2007), p. 81. Th is 
of course raises the question of what should exactly be understood by the notion of quasi-legislative 
measures. Th is question is not only relevant in distinguishing Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, since the 
notion has also recently been relied on by Lenaerts to distinguish the executive acts which only the 
Commission may adopt from the acts which the decentralized agencies may adopt. See K. Lenaerts, 
‘EMU and the EU’s constitutional framework’, 39 European Law Review (2014), p. 762.
24 M. van der Plas, ‘Rol Europees Parlement fors toegenomen door nieuw Comitologiebesluit’, 54 
Tijdschrift  voor Europees en economisch recht (2006), p. 413. Discussing the diff erent interpretations of 
‘quasi-legislative’ measures, see M. Szapiro, ‘Comitologie: rétrospective et prospective après la réforme 
de 2006’, Revue du Droit de l’Union européenne (2006), p. 571–574.
25 M. van der Plas, 54 Tijdschrift  voor Europees en economisch recht (2006), p. 414.
26 Council Legal Service, Opinion on the amended proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision 
1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the 
Commission (9087/04), 5923/06, p. 12–13.
27 Th e French notion of ‘mettre en œuvre’ better conveys this meaning than the English notion of 
‘implementation’. Compare for instance para. 30 of the English and French language versions of the 
Council Legal Service Opinion 5923/06.
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pursuant to the PRAC if they are quasi-legislative measures. In fact, the General Court 
addressed this question but subsequently drew the wrong conclusions. It found that 
Eurostat’s guidelines and manuals would come under the Article 291 TFEU notion of 
implementation ignoring the fact that acts adopted pursuant to the PRAC, in principle, 
can never come under the Article 291 TFEU notion of implementation as defi ned by the 
Court in Biocides.
Had the General Court followed the line of reasoning suggested here, it would 
have been faced with a similar situation as the one which was at issue before the CJEU 
in Common Market Fertilizers.28 In that case, the Commission had been empowered 
by the Council to adopt measures, pursuant to the regulatory comitology procedure, 
implementing (under ex Article  202 EC) the EC Customs Code. In one of these 
implementing measures, the Commission granted itself a further power to adopt 
individual decisions (on remission and repayment of customs duties) without having 
to go through the regulatory comitology procedure. Common Market Fertilizers, 
a company aff ected by such an individual decision, argued that the Commission had 
thereby acted ultra vires and that it should have prescribed the regulatory comitology 
procedure to adopt such individual decisions. Th e CJEU however referred back to the 
(second) comitology decision which prescribes that the regulatory procedure is to be 
used to adopt measures of general application.29 As a result, that procedure could not be 
used to adopt individual decisions and the Commission was free to prescribe a diff erent 
procedure, as the Council had been silent on this in its legislative act.30 In this regard, 
Kollmeyer rightly argues that the Court should still have found a problem in the Council’s 
legislative regulation in so far as it allowed the Commission to adopt these individual 
implementing measures without formal recourse to one of the other procedures of the 
comitology decision (the management or advisory procedure), the comitology decision 
being an act of infra-constitutional (organic) law.31
By analogy then, the legislator in casu had prescribed the PRAC, but since that 
procedure can only be used to adopt measures which supplement the legislative act, while 
Eurostat’s guidelines and manuals are implementing (in the strict sense) measures, it 
could not be applicable. Instead, because Eurostat’s measures are necessary to uniformly 
implement the rules on consumer price indices (contained in the binding legislative 
regulation and in the Commission’s regulations), Article 291 TFEU applies and one of 
the procedures foreseen in the comitology regulation (adopted pursuant to Article 291(3) 
TFEU) ought to have been prescribed. Th is way, the Netherlands’ third plea should have 
28 See Case C-443/05 P Common Market Fertilizers SA v. Commission, EU:C:2007:511.
29 See Article 2(1)(b) of Decision 468/1999.
30 Case C-443/05 P Common Market Fertilizers SA v. Commission, para. 125, 134.
31 See D. Kollmeyer, Delegierte Rechtsetzung in der EU – Eine Analyse der Art. 290 und 291 AEUV (Nomos, 
2015), p. 317–318. In addition, Kollmeyer notes that the Court might not have taken issue with this 
because the procedure which the Commission had laid down de facto came down to the comitology 
advisory procedure (without being formally indicated as such).
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been rejected but its fourth plea would have been upheld and the General Court would 
have properly upheld the Lisbon Treaty’s reform in the area of executive decision-making.
A. THE PRAC POST-LISBON
Although no new references to the PRAC have been introduced in the body of (formal) 
EU legislation since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty over six years ago, the 
legislation currently in force still contains ample references to the procedure. As noted 
above, the Commission had initially planned to have updated the acquis to the new 
reality of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU by the end of the 7th parliamentary term in 2014.32 
However, because of Member States’ resistance in the Council, that proved to be more 
diffi  cult than foreseen. Th e three proposals which the Commission made in 2013 to 
align the remaining legislative acts (roughly 220) referring to the PRAC33 remained in 
limbo in the Council and, following the adoption of its 2015 work programme, the new 
Commission decided to withdraw these proposals, indicating that the issue would be 
addressed in the new inter-institutional agreement on Better Regulation.34 Th at inter-
institutional agreement of December 2015 provides that the Commission will propose a 
new alignment by the end of 2016.35 In the meantime, the PRAC applies in diverse areas 
– some 165 PRAC measures were still adopted in 2014, mainly in the areas of ‘Health and 
Food Safety’, ‘Mobility and Transport’ and ‘Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship 
and SMEs’.36
Th e refusal to align the pre-Lisbon legislation to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU stands 
in stark contrast with the institutions’ commitment to ‘Better regulation’ and it remains 
to be seen whether any alignment through a(n) (set of) omnibus act(s) will ever be 
achieved. Aft er all, it should be stressed again that the power which the Member States 
in Council wield pursuant to the PRAC far surpasses their power when delegated acts 
(or implementing acts) are adopted.37 While a comprehensive comparison between the 
32 See the statements by the Commission annexed to the comitology regulation, [2011] OJ L 55/19.
33 See COM(2013) 451 fi nal; COM(2013) 452 fi nal; and COM(2013) 751 fi nal.  See also M. Chamon, 
‘Clarifying the divide between Delegated and Implementing Acts? Case C-427/12, European 
Commission v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union’, 42 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration (2015), p. 177–178.
34 See Annex II to the Commission Work Programme 2015, p. 11–12.
35 See para. 21a of the Provisional text of the proposed interinstitutional agreement on Better Regulation, 
p. 8.
36 See Table IV in the Commission’s report on the working of Committees in 2014, COM(2015) 418 fi nal, 
p. 7.
37 Comparing the PRAC to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, one would assume that the delegated act’s fi eld of 
application minimally encompasses all PRAC measures (without being restricted thereto) since both 
are used when non-essential elements of legislative acts are amended or supplemented (see also footnote 
1 above). Th is was also advocated by the Commission and Parliament. See European Commission, 
COM(2009) 673 fi nal, p. 3; European Parliament, Resolution on the power of legislative delegation of 
5 May 2010, [2011] OJ C 81E/6, para. 18. However, in one of its three 2013 proposals to align the PRAC to 
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PRAC and the procedures under Article 290 and 291 TFEU cannot be elaborated here,38 
it suffi  ces to note that under the PRAC there is a mandatory involvement of Member 
State experts before an act is adopted (unlike for the delegated act)39 and these experts’ 
opinions constrain the Commission much more than the opinions adopted pursuant 
to the comitology procedures under the present comitology regulation. In addition, 
depending on the opinion of the committee, the PRAC allows the Commission to be 
divested of the power to adopt an act, which instead may be adopted by the Council. 
Again this is diff erent under Articles  290 and 291 TFEU whereby delegated acts are 
always adopted by the Commission and the comitology procedures only foresee the 
Commission as the authority adopting implementing acts.40
In practice, a certain discrepancy may be noted between the importance attached 
by the Member States to their involvement through the PRAC and the odd instances 
in which they actually succeed in making use of their powers. Between 2010 and 2014 
some 830 measures have been adopted pursuant to the PRAC.41 By contrast, only fi ve 
measures were vetoed by the Council (under the PRAC) during that period.42 In addition, 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, the Commission included a list of legislative acts referencing to the PRAC 
which ought to be amended with reference to the comitology examination procedure foreseen in the 
comitology regulation. See Annex II of COM(2013) 751 fi nal.
38 For a discussion, see inter alia, C. Blumann, ‘À la frontière de la fonction législative et de la fonction 
exécutive: les ‘nouveaux’ actes délégués’, in G. Cohen-Jonathan et al. (eds.), Chemins d’Europe: Mélanges 
en l’honneur de Jean Paul Jacqué (Dalloz, 2010), p. 140–144.
39 Note however that the 2016 Common Understanding (between the political institutions) on delegated 
acts has re-introduced a de facto advisory comitology procedure for the adoption of delegated acts. See 
point 4 of the Common Understanding, annexed to the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-
Making, [2016] OJ L 123/1.
40 Obviously, Article 291(2) TFEU still allows the Council to adopt implementing acts ‘in duly justifi ed 
specifi c cases’, but these acts are never subjected to the procedures laid down in the comitology regulation.
41 Own calculations based on the numbers provided in the Commission’s annual comitology reports, see 
COM(2011) 879 fi nal, p. 6; COM(2012) 685 fi nal, p. 9; COM(2013) 701 fi nal, p. 7; COM(2014) 572 fi nal, 
p. 9; COM(2015) 418 fi nal, p. 8.
42 Ibid. Even when the Council uses its veto, it does not necessarily have good political or legal reasons 
to do so. Th is is illustrated by the Council’s veto to a proposed amendment of Commission Regulation 
282/2008. To identify the procedure to be used to grant certain authorizations, this Regulation 
originally referred back to one of the articles of its own basic regulation (which referred to a procedure 
in the comitology decision), instead of referring directly to the comitology decision. Th e article of the 
basic regulation thereby originally referred to the regulatory comitology procedure but following an 
amendment in 2009 this was changed into a reference to the PRAC, which had unintended consequences 
for the authorization procedure under Regulation 282/2008. Th e Commission thus proposed to rectify 
this, amending Regulation 282/2008 so that it would refer to another article in the basic regulation 
which still referred to the regulatory comitology procedure (to be read as the examination comitology 
procedure following the entry into force of the comitology regulation). Regulation 282/2008 would 
therefore not itself have referred to the (abolished) regulatory comitology procedure, but the Council 
Legal Service ignored this and seemed to make no distinction between a Commission regulation 
referring to a basic legislative act which still refers to the abolished procedure and a Commission 
regulation referring directly to an abolished procedure. See Council, Doc. 14919/14. Th e Council 
followed its Legal Service and used its veto. See Council, Doc. 14975/14. Th e Commission later adopted 
an identical measure which referred directly to the new examination procedure rather than indirectly 
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in those cases where the Commission submitted a proposal to the Council as a result of 
there being no (or a negative) opinion of the Committee, the Council rarely achieves the 
necessary qualifi ed majority to adopt the executive measure itself.43 Most of the time the 
Council cannot fi nd a qualifi ed majority for or against the measure and the Commission 
is left  to adopt it,44 including in sensitive cases such as for instance the use of lactic acid 
in beef meat processing (a practice similar to that of chlorine chickens).45
As noted above, the Commission will present a new proposal for an alignment of 
the PRAC to the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 2016. It remains to be seen whether the 
Commission will be able to overcome the Member States’ apparent mistrust in it. If not, 
the PRAC will die a very slow death, only disappearing when each of the legislative acts 
involved is individually recast or repealed in the ‘ordinary’ process of the periodical 
updating of the EU’s acquis.
§6. CONCLUSION
Had the implementation of the reform through the Lisbon Treaty stayed on course, 
the PRAC would not have been a subject of debate in 2016, save for historic treatises 
on comitology. As with other issues coming under Articles 290 and 291 however, the 
reform of the Lisbon Treaty is much less real than hoped and the pre-Lisbon regulatory 
comitology procedure with scrutiny seems much more tenacious than imagined.
Th is means that the Courts are confronted with problems which in reality should 
not have posed themselves, had the institutions conscientiously implemented the Lisbon 
Treaty’s new framework of implementing and delegated acts. Th at said, the General 
Court’s decision in Netherlands v. Commission should be criticized as well. At fi rst 
sight, the General Court seems motivated by a concern to uphold Article 291 TFEU but 
in reality its solution of the case is legally fl awed and undermines the Lisbon Treaty’s 
reform as six years aft er the Treaty’s entry into force new (non-legislative) acts still may 
be created prescribing the use of the PRAC to adopt further measures.
to the old regulatory procedure (to be read as the examination procedure). See Commission Regulation 
(EU) 2015/1906, [2005] OJ L 278/11.
43 For the few exceptions during the reference period, see Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 on the 
quality of petrol and diesel fuels, [2015] OJ L 107/26; Council Directive (EU) 2011/97 on the storage 
of metallic mercury considered as waste, [2011] OJ L 328/49; Council Regulation (EU) No. 333/2011 
on certain types of scrap metal cease to be waste, [2011] OJ L 94/2; Council Decision (EU) 2010/252 on 
Frontex operations, [2010] OJ L 111/20. Th e latter decision was annulled by the Court in Case C-355/10 
Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2012:516.
44 See Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/293 on persistent organic pollutants, OJ L 55/4; Commission 
Regulation (EU) 715/2013 on copper scrap ceases to be waste, [2013] OJ L 201/14; Commission 
Directive (EU) 2013/44 on powdered corn cob, [2013] OJ L 204/49; Commission Directive (EU) 
2013/2 on packaging and packaging waste, [2013] OJ L 37/10; Commission Directive (EU) 2012/20 on 
fl ufenoxuron, [2012] OJ L 177/25; Commission Directive (EU) 2011/71 on creosote, [2011] OJ L 195/46.
45 See Commission Regulation (EU) 101/2013, [2013] OJ L 34/1.
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Th e General Court was right to rely on Article  291 TFEU but it should then also 
have acknowledged that the PRAC’s function is fundamentally diff erent from that of 
Article 291 TFEU. Th is would have led the Court to the conclusion that, since Article 291 
TFEU applied, one of the procedures in the Comitology regulation should have been 
prescribed. Th is way the Lisbon Treaty’s reform would have been genuinely upheld.
